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CHAPTER 10 
The parchment imperialists: texts, scribes, and the medieval western 
Empire, c.1250–c.1440 
LEN SCALES 
 
 
‘The dear Holy Roman Empire, whatever holds it together?’, sings a reveller in Auerbach’s 
Cellar in part one of Faust, which Goethe completed in 1806, the year of the Empire’s 
extinction. For the late Middle Ages, it is a question with which historians continue to 
grapple; one which has elicited various theories, but no certainty.
1
 On one matter at least, 
however, a well-established and durable consensus does exist: whatever it may have been, it 
can have had little to do with bureaucracy.
2
 Of no period does this appear truer than of the 
late Middle Ages. The medieval Roman Empire was at no time an intensively-governed 
polity. Even in the heyday of its power, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the institutions 
of the Empire’s government reached thinly and very unevenly across its vast geographic 
extent. About their working and their efficacy a great deal is obscure.
3
 Much always 
depended upon the monarch’s personal presence. However, in the two centuries between the 
end of the Hohenstaufen dynasty in the mid-thirteenth century and the long Habsburg 
ascendancy which begins in the fifteenth, such administrative structures as existed for the 
Empire appear actually to wither and contract. Relatively little in the way of new institutions 
emerged to take their place. And yet, despite all this, hold together the Empire largely did, 
albeit with some erosion, including the loss of significant territorial fragments, at the margins. 
Explaining why this should have been raises important questions, both about the character of 
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the medieval Reich as an empire and about the role of administration in extended pre-modern 
realms more generally. 
 
I 
The imperial character of the late-medieval Empire was expressed most explicitly in its 
fundamental doctrines, in its accustomed titles, and in the views of history held by its literate 
partisans. An empire—in Latin, imperium; in German, less straightforwardly, rîche—was 
what documents issued in its ruler’s name consistently pronounced it to be.4 To lawyers, 
chroniclers, poets and their audiences, it was the direct continuator of the Roman empire of 
the Caesars. By the late Middle Ages, this principle, reinforced by an imperialist reading of a 
number of familiar biblical passages, had long provided a foundation for highly ambitious 
claims. Among these was the insistence that, as the temporal counterpart of the pope, the 
Empire’s ruler should move on a similarly universal stage and enjoy a primacy (although this 
was seldom precisely defined) over other Christian monarchs.
5
 How literally such claims 
were understood and how seriously they were taken, even among the Empire’s adherents, let 
alone neighbours and rivals, should not be overestimated.
6
 At the same time, they cannot be 
altogether dismissed, since their repetition, even in times of the Empire’s visible weakness, 
pertained to the public style of its rulers. Doctrine, and doctrinal controversy, surrounded and 
defined the medieval Empire to an unusual degree. This element of distinctiveness helps to 
account for the particular role taken by written acts in its late-medieval life. 
 The Reich must also, however, be understood—and understood as an empire—by 
locating it in space. Enumerating its component lands makes clear that, although 
geographically large, the Empire had limits just like any other medieval realm (see fig. 10.1). 
 
[Fig. 10.1. The Reich in the time of Charles IV, c.1378] 
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This was plain enough to late-medieval observers who, a handful of uncertain borderlands 
apart, could distinguish without difficulty between ‘places under the Roman Empire’ and 
those that were not.
7
 The political community supported by these far-flung territories was a 
composite one. Its original core, corresponding to the eastern portion of the Carolingian 
patrimony, north of the Alps and east of the Rhine, had emerged out of the fragmentation of 
Charlemagne’s empire during the course of the ninth century. In the tenth and eleventh, under 
rulers from the Ottonian (Saxon) and Salian (Franconian) dynasties, this kingdom of largely 
Germanic speech became joined together with blocs of territory in Italy and Burgundy. Each 
of these came likewise to be understood as a distinct kingdom, with its own crown.
8
 The 
same period also saw the addition of Lotharingia, west of the Rhine, with its mixed Germanic 
and Romance-speaking populations. The entry of the western Slavs into Christendom, 
meanwhile, had paved the way for the incorporation, over time, of further ethnic and political 
groupings along the Empire’s eastern marches in the north. The title of emperor itself was 
acquired by means of coronation in Rome, customarily (although, as the late Middle Ages 
were to prove, not necessarily) at the hands of the pope.
9
 Prior to that, however, the Empire’s 
ruler was normally crowned king at Charlemagne’s old capital of Aachen.10 In the late 
Middle Ages, a majority among these mainly German-speaking ‘kings of the Romans’ (L. 
reges Romanorum) had to settle for this northern coronation alone (see fig. 10.2).
11
 
 
[Fig. 10.2. Rulers of the empire (1211–1439)] 
 
 Such, then, was the Empire—or, as it was termed in its own official acts, the Roman 
Empire, or the Holy Empire, or (from the thirteenth century ever more frequently) the Holy 
Roman Empire:
12
 an idea, and a body of historic titles; but also a large, loosely-structured, 
polycentric political formation, multi-ethnic in composition but largely Germanic as regards 
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the origin and culture of its rulers and their servants. In these respects, it does indeed appear 
as an ‘empire’, of a type recognisable in other historical periods and societies. Beyond its 
German ‘metropolis’-zone lay extended ‘peripheries’: Italy, Burgundy, and the eastern 
marchlands, within which by the late Middle Ages the kingdom of Bohemia was the most 
distinct and prestigious element.
13
 These regions were no mere extensions of the German 
core, but constitutionally, culturally and geographically separate. The southern lands in 
particular were also unmistakably subordinate, in constitutional practice and historical 
memory: they were where the Empire’s German-speaking ruler, and his mostly German-
speaking followers, went—although over time less often—in order to exercise rule. The 
Romance-speaking peripheries of the Reich supplied none of its medieval rulers—although 
for a significant portion of the later Middle Ages the Empire’s monarch wore the Bohemian 
crown. 
By the late Middle Ages, the age of the Empire’s expansion lay far in the past: there 
had been little substantive and lasting growth since the early decades of the eleventh century. 
Parcels of territory nevertheless continued to be added here and there, mainly as a fortuitous 
concomitant to dynastic acquisition strategies. And yet, despite the exhortation to the 
monarch, embedded in the German-vernacular form of his documentary title, to be an 
‘augmentor of the Reich’, the late Middle Ages brought no discernible ‘imperialism of 
intent’, still less an ‘imperialism of result’.14 At most, kings and emperors strove, with mixed 
success, to hold what they had, while encasing their public appearances within a luxuriating, 
legitimising imperialism of performance.
15
 While spectacle has historically been central to 
many forms of imperial rule, in the late-medieval Reich an extended theatre of majesty 
evolved less in order to underpin the power of rule than as a means of negotiating some of its 
more visible limitations.
16
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In the thirteenth century, the principle of dynastic succession, according to which, in 
practice at least, the imperial throne had been filled for much of the Empire’s previous post-
Carolingian history, had ended with the deaths of the last legitimate rulers from the 
Hohenstaufen dynasty. Henceforth, the monarch was chosen by an exclusive group of seven 
princes, the electors, whose constitutional status and powers were to receive definitive 
expression in the Golden Bull of 1356.
17
 Into the second half of the fifteenth century, the 
death of the reigning monarch would now almost always bring a break in continuity, as a new 
prince, with his own established servants and his own geographic powerbase, ascended the 
throne. For significant periods, moreover, the Empire’s rule was contested by rival 
candidates, of different dynasties. The implications of these facts for any elements of 
bureaucracy serving the monarchy will already be plain. 
 
II 
Such elements were in any case very limited. Regional and local institutions of government 
amenable to oversight by the monarch and his court were meagre and unevenly distributed 
within the Empire, the means of their operation and supervision uncertain. The cadre of 
ministeriales (legally-unfree military retainers), with whose aid the emperors of the central 
Middle Ages had sought to exercise a measure of control over local resources, were 
assimilated after the end of the Hohenstaufen era into the ranks of the lower nobility.
18
 They 
found successors of a kind in the regional ‘advocates’ (G. Landvögte), established under the 
Habsburg Rudolf I, to recover and administer the depleted imperial fisc (G. Reichsgut).
19
 But 
of the specific functions which these figures, drawn from the middling regional nobility, 
performed in the Empire’s service, relatively little is known. It is not certain whether they 
even had a common, defined round of duties, and there is little indication of how, and how 
successfully, they were called to account. Characteristically, their regional distribution was 
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uneven, and was confined to the territories north of the Alps. Under Charles IV, there are 
clear indications that the network of imperial ‘advocates’ was breaking down.20 
It is possible that historians have been led by the fewness of the records to 
underestimate both the extent and the efficacy of the monarchy’s access to local resources in 
the post-Staufer period. Chance documentary survivals seem to indicate more complex and 
durable local infrastructures than was once thought, and a widely-acknowledged expectation 
that the king’s local ministers would answer for their acts.21 But while the meagreness and 
unevenness of documentary survivals in this field may have various explanations, merely the 
fact that so little was retained—even where a good deal more must once have been written 
down—invites conclusions about the character of imperial administration.22 These can hardly 
be optimistic, and it does not seem difficult to explain why the Empire’s resource base 
contracted so rapidly and irrevocably after the Staufer. 
Significantly, rather more is known about the arrangements which late-medieval 
rulers made to administer the large dynastic blocs which they were engaged in assembling 
within the frontiers of the Reich. It was here, and not in the management of imperial 
resources, that new developments are more often to be discerned. No monarch was more 
active in the field than Charles IV. The Landbook of the Mark Brandenburg, compiled for the 
north-eastern principality which the emperor acquired for his dynasty in the early 1370s, is a 
detailed land survey, unparalleled in the administration of the contemporary Reich.
23
 The 
cohesive (albeit, as it turned out, short-lived) territorial agglomeration which Charles 
constructed in the 1350s and 1360s in the Upper Palatinate, between Franconia and the 
Bohemian frontier, illustrates how new lands might be managed. Although constitutionally a 
limb of the Bohemian crown, ‘the emperor’s lordship in Bavaria’ was administered 
separately from the other Luxemburg territories, by a hierarchical structure of accountable 
officials, some of them local men, others appointed from the Bohemian court in Prague.
24
 Yet 
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Charles’s reign brought no comparable creativity in administering what remained of the 
Empire’s own material base, or in governing its far-flung provinces.25 The emperor’s fabled 
literacy, learning and wisdom in judgement were not applied in any significant degree to the 
institutional reform of the Reich: the Golden Bull, for all its constitutional importance, had 
little to say about material matters of government.
26
 
 The rule of the Roman kings and emperors was located predominantly at their court. 
But the imperial court was, in European comparison, at most times a modest affair. Its size 
and capacity for growth were limited in part by its largely itinerant character. Even an 
emperor such as Charles IV, who developed his dynastic capital of Prague as a residential 
centre and a stage for the spectacle of monarchy, still travelled tirelessly throughout much of 
his reign. According to one calculation, Charles made in total more than 1,200 stays at 438 
different locations, within a zone extending from Rome to Lübeck and from Paris to 
Kraków.
27
 It is true that almost every late-medieval monarch had his favoured sites, where a 
disproportionate amount of his reign was spent. Such places might also be home to valued 
bodies of specialists and experts—as was Heidelberg under Rupert of the Palatinate, where 
the family seat of the Rhenish counts palatine included a university (founded in 1386).
28
 It is 
also true that the proportion of their reigns which kings and emperors spent at residential 
centres tended to become greater over the course of the late Middle Ages. It is even the case 
that, with the development of metropolitan sites, certain offices of imperial government 
proved able to put down at least shallow and short-lived roots—with the most salient location 
for such growth being Caroline Prague.
29
 Nevertheless, at no time did there develop an 
institution comparable to the English Exchequer, with firm geographic fixity regardless of the 
king’s movements.30 
 An obvious obstacle to any such development was the strongly discontinuous 
character of the late-medieval imperial monarchy itself. Within a period of well over two 
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hundred years, between the end of the Hohenstaufen and the late fifteenth century, son 
succeeded father on the throne just once.
31
 Particularly if a reign ended abruptly, or with the 
monarch in distant parts, a breach in government was likely to result. When Henry VII died 
in Italy in 1312, many of his documents remained there, never to return north of the Alps.
32
 
Such discontinuity was heightened by the circumstances of controversy and division in which 
the crown more than once changed hands. Of the scribes who had loyally served the 
excommunicate Ludwig the Bavarian, almost none put their pens at the disposal of his 
papally-backed supplanter, Charles IV.
33
 Rupert of the Palatinate tried in vain to gain 
possession of the chancery registers of his predecessor, Wenceslas, who following his 
deposition by the princes in 1400 continued to insist that he was the rightful king.
34
 Not only 
Wenceslas’s chancery books but those of Charles IV proved beyond the reach of Sigismund, 
probably in consequence of the social and religious upheavals in his family’s Bohemian 
powerbase.
35
 
 It is little wonder, then, that imperial administration in the late Middle Ages appears 
locked into a downward spiral of narrowing possibility. One measure of this is provided by 
the Empire’s shrinking material base. Without durable instruments for their oversight and 
receipt, imperial revenues fell steadily. There is evidence (albeit uncertain and problematic) 
indicating that annual yields from the fisc may have declined from over 100,000 gulden in the 
early fourteenth century to roughly 17,500 under Rupert and perhaps just 13,000 under his 
successor, Sigismund. Such sums were dwarfed by the incomes of the German territorial 
princes, to say nothing of those of other European monarchs.
36
 While periodic efforts were 
made to recoup losses, the impulse to grant and to pledge proved stronger, with the result that 
the fourteenth century in particular saw what proved to be an irreversible dissipation of the 
Empire’s properties. By the time of Frederick III’s accession in 1440, there was nothing left 
to pawn.
37
 Partial compensation was provided by the extension, in the same period, of the 
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dynastic patrimonies of the kings and emperors, and their exploitation as resources of rule. 
No monarch built more avidly in this way than Charles IV, just as none pledged more 
liberally.
38
 Nevertheless, the Empire’s ruler now appeared to contemporaries at times as a 
threadbare figure. Rudolf I, according to one generally well-informed chronicler, could offer 
nothing beyond pious evasiveness when asked to name the keeper of his fiscal chamber.
39
 
 Under these circumstances, the limitations of imperial government were naturally 
more apparent to contemporaries—and have been more readily discernible by modern 
observers—than its capabilities. Those limitations are starkly apparent in the sphere of 
justice, the fundamental and defining activity of medieval monarchy. The ‘curial court’ (G. 
Hofgericht), established by Frederick II to receive appeals from the Empire’s subjects, was 
hamstrung by being tied to the peripatetic court, and by the exemptions from its jurisdiction 
enjoyed by the princes, and increasingly also by towns.
40
 Even at its height, the level of 
business handled by the Hofgericht was hardly impressive. Under Charles IV, it appears that 
the court was hearing no more than eight to ten cases per year.
41
 The late Middle Ages also 
saw the keeping of the public peace (G. Landfriede), for which Frederick II had in 1235 made 
general provision, pass increasingly out of the monarch’s hands and into those of the regional 
and local powers. The attempt made under Wenceslas, to divide the Empire’s German lands 
into regional peace-keeping ‘circles’ under imperial authority, proved short-lived.42 The fact 
that emperors for a time lent their backing even to a judicial instrument as arbitrary and 
obscure as the Westphalian ‘free courts’ (G. Veme) is evidence of the smallness of their scope 
for effectual reform.
43
 
 Developments were just as sluggish and fitful in other areas of government. The 
Empire’s late-medieval rulers had no powers of general taxation, and no forum for convening 
representatives of the political community in order to seek such powers. While assemblies did 
meet periodically under the headship of the monarch (and increasingly, indeed, without him), 
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before the late fifteenth century these were limited in scope and highly variable in 
composition.
44
 Regular taxation (when this had not been alienated) was confined to the 
imperial towns and the Jews, with the towns in particular putting up strong resistance to the 
attempts which their rulers occasionally made to increase the yield.
45
 Extraordinary levies 
and fines, judicial dues and fees for the issue and confirmation of diplomas afforded some 
additional sustenance.
46
 But only in the face of the Hussite emergency in the third decade of 
the fifteenth century were means sought, at first largely unsuccessfully, to extend the tax 
base.
47
 There was no standing military force at the ruler’s disposal, and his capacity to require 
service from the Empire’s subjects was highly limited. Before the campaigns against the 
Hussites, there does not seem even to have existed a full record of the military services owed 
to the Empire.
48
 The German communities from which the manpower for imperial armies was 
principally drawn showed a marked reluctance to support their rulers’ more extended military 
campaigns, ‘over the mountains’, into Italy. When the contingent from Mainz returned from 
King Rupert’s short and inglorious expedition to the south, the town informed the king that it 
was no longer willing to send its men into Lombardy—to ‘such a far-off land’.49 It is easy to 
understand why the Empire’s late-medieval rulers, in contrast to their European neighbours, 
generally avoided major military commitments. They were in no position to act the part of 
imperial conquerors, despite the efforts of contemporary writers and artists, in traditional 
style, to paint them in that role.
50
 
 
III 
The fundamental administrative institution for the late-medieval Reich was the chancery. 
This was a court institution and its servants were court servants: their allegiance was to the 
person of the monarch, not to abstract notions of ‘state’ or public duty. The emergence of the 
chancery as a body distinct from the court chapel was still a fairly recent development in the 
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thirteenth century, and the chancery can easily be ascribed firmer substance than the meagre 
evidence warrants.
51
 It is best understood—particularly under the earliest post-Staufer 
kings—less as a settled bureau than as a pool of literate, beneficed clerks of fairly fluid 
composition and fluctuating size. In all this it exemplifies the archaic qualities of late-
medieval imperial government generally, within which document culture still showed few 
traces of the processes of internal differentiation and specialisation evident elsewhere. 
Within the chancery, there seems to have existed at most an informal allocation of 
duties between different notaries.
52
 There was no subdivision into separate offices for 
different imperial territories. Not until the reign of the Habsburg Frederick III (1440–93) did 
the monarch’s dynastic lands become the responsibility of a separate staff of clerks, largely 
distinct from those engaged with imperial affairs.
53
 Only those writings which related to the 
business of the curial court (G. Hofgericht) were consistently kept apart, written by specialist 
scribes and issued under their own seal.
54
 The signs are that procedures long remained 
informal, with written instructions for the guidance of those writing in the monarch’s name 
limited or non-existent.
55
 There is no certain indication of any registration of outgoing 
documents before the reign of Henry VII; and not until the time of Rupert of the Palatinate, a 
century later, do registers survive in substantial number.
56
 Registration during the fourteenth 
century was partial and haphazard, and may have been abandoned altogether for a time under 
Ludwig the Bavarian.
57
 
 The central administrative body of the late-medieval Reich therefore displays little 
conformity to the principles of weberian Weberian ‘legal-rational’ bureaucracy.58 Far from 
insisting that its servants  being obliged to fit their behaviour to an office defined by abstract 
rules, the more senior among them the Empire’s servants in particular enjoyed considerable 
freedom to define the character and scope of their office for themselves.
59
 There was 
accordingly no single, fixed way of being chancellor. Some chancellors involved themselves 
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extensively in the daily business of document-production, while others did not.
60
 Johann von 
Neumarkt, the long-serving head of Charles IV’s writing office, devoted himself to wide-
ranging literary, cultural and intellectual pursuits at court, about which much more is known 
than about his administrative duties.
61
 The vice-chancellors who served under some, though 
not all, monarchs also varied markedly in their functions.
62
 Even protonotaries might be 
much more than just chief scribes, while some did not perform that role at all.
63
 The clerks 
who served under them were likewise involved in a wide array of tasks, beyond the drafting 
and writing-up of documents—among them fiscal accounting and service as envoys. There is 
no trace of a body of regulations defining the extent of these roles, and nothing to suggest that 
they constituted clearly-delineated offices.
64
 Appointment and advancement were governed 
by kinship, patronage and regional connections, rather than merit or open competition.
65
 
When backed by the monarch, a chancellor’s initiative power could be great: Raban 
von Helmstatt is credited with assembling largely from scratch the body of scribes which 
served Rupert of the Palatinate, drawing on his own extensive contacts.
66
 But the initiatives 
of leading clerks might also run in more wayward channels. Ludwig the Bavarian accused his 
protonotary Ulrich Wild of acting without authorisation and against the king’s interests, in 
drawing up a manifesto associating Ludwig’s cause with that of the Franciscan opponents of 
the Avignon papacy.
67
 Means of control capable of preventing unwelcome freelancing were 
lacking. The literate servants of the king might also on occasion answer to other masters, with 
the influence of the electors, above all the three Rhineland archbishops, particularly to the 
fore. Archbishop Gerhard of Mainz was able to ensure that one of his own close associates 
was appointed as protonotary under Adolf of Nassau, whom Gerhard had played an 
instrumental part in raising to the throne.
68
 The archbishop, whose honorific rank of imperial 
arch-chancellor for Germany reinforced and legitimised his political domination over the new 
king, asserted a power of veto over specific chancery appointments.
69
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 The quantity of writings produced by imperial scribes appears distinctly modest, 
particularly when compared with the output of governmental acts from the Empire’s late-
medieval neighbours. Recent estimates of the total number of documents issued in the 
monarch’s name in the busy thirty-two-year reign of Charles IV have proposed a figure 
between nine and ten thousand.
70
 This is certainly not a negligible tally, and it is higher than 
those attained under his predecessors. Yet already more than half a century earlier the 
somewhat shorter tenure of King Philip IV of France (r. 1285–1314) had yielded more than 
15,000 royal letters.
71
 The most prolific contemporary bureaucracies put Charles’s output in 
the shade. Under Pope John XXII (1316—1324), the papal chancery issued on average 3,646 
letters each year, while in 1324 the English king’s clerks sealed nearly three-and-a-half 
thousand standardised writs in a single (admittedly exceptional) month.
72
 
 No less revealing is the character of the writings most often issued under the imperial 
seal. At least among surviving and known documents, it is diplomas granting or confirming 
favours and privileges that continued into the late Middle Ages to take the dominant share, as 
they had in earlier centuries.
73
 New documentary instruments of this sort characteristically 
reflected the aspirations of recipients more than central initiative.
74
 It is true that other kinds 
of writing—such as letters and mandates directed at important political actors, such as the 
imperial towns—were probably issued in greater quantity than we can now know;75 but the 
over-all picture remains a traditional one. Typically, documents were addressed to individuals 
or to relatively small groups. Even perhaps the most famous constitutional text in the 
Empire’s entire history, Charles IV’s Golden Bull, is best understood, in its origins at least, as 
a privilege, issued as just seven originals (two of them retrospective), for individuals and 
communities directly touched by its provisions.
76
 Conceding and legitimising came more 
easily than did commanding or forbidding. Only very rarely did the written acts of the Reich 
aspire to speak to audiences across its length and breadth.
77
 Documents under the imperial 
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seal were bespoke, individualised texts, not items of mass production—a fact which does 
much to explain their comparatively modest numbers.
78
 Routine and repetition, the hallmarks 
of modern bureaucratic method, are little in evidence.
79
 Standardised instruments along the 
lines of the English writ are no more to be found than are the networks of local royal officials 
which would have been necessary for their implementation.
80
 It is no surprise, therefore, that 
the Empire’s administration never became the subject of literary celebration, in the manner 
found in England as early as the twelfth century in the Dialogue of the exchequer.
81
 
 Even such documents as were produced covered the Empire’s vast territories very 
unevenly. Of the known output of Charles IV’s chancery, no less than thirty-eight per cent 
was addressed to individuals and groups located in just three fairly compact German-
speaking regions with traditionally close ties to the monarchy: Franconia, the middle Rhine, 
and Swabia.
82
 By contrast, the entire northern third of Germany, together with the Empire’s 
largely Romance-speaking western borderlands (comprising in total around half of the 
territories of the Reich north of the Alps), received just fifteen per cent. For the greatest 
princely territories, different rules applied. Dealings with the Habsburg lands, whose princes 
never travelled to imperial assemblies, had something of the character of relations with a 
foreign power, conducted by means of envoys sent out from the imperial court.
83
 Under 
Charles IV (who was father-in-law to the reigning duke of Austria), only three per cent of 
imperial documents, and none of an intrusive or mandatory kind, were dispatched to this 
extensive zone.
84
 With growing distance from the court, grants of title and privileges were apt 
to loom increasingly large among the chancery’s output. In northern Italy by the mid-
fourteenth century the main role of imperial government had become the granting, in return 
for substantial payments, of legal titles to legitimise the power of those who ruled within their 
regions already.
85
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 The men who drafted and wrote up these documents came disproportionately from a 
limited number of mainly German-speaking territories. Typically, these were again the old 
imperial heartlands around the Main, the middle and upper Rhine, and in the German south-
west, along with the dynastic powerbase of the reigning monarch. From Rudolf I’s reign, all 
surviving Hofgericht documents are in Swabian dialect.
86
 Ludwig IV’s scribes came, like 
their master, from the German south, particularly from the Wittelsbach lands in Upper 
Bavaria, as well as from Ludwig’s favoured urban support-bases, Augsburg and 
Nuremberg.
87
 Charles IV’s chancery was staffed with a mix of recruits from the northern core 
lands of the Reich and from the vast eastern domains of the house of Luxemburg, especially 
Moravia and Silesia.
88
 When the monarch came from a princely dynasty with an established 
territorial chancery, as did Charles, this typically provided a kernel around which an imperial 
writing office took shape.
89
 Only when the new king lacked a family scriptorium, as did the 
count-king William of Holland, was a body of scribes of necessity brought together from 
more diverse sources.
90
 Those who wrote in the Empire’s name tended on the whole to 
display a princely-dynastic, not imperial, orientation at the reigning monarch’s death. Most of 
the personnel from Ludwig IV’s chancery found new homes in Bavarian ducal service, while 
a majority of King Rupert’s clerks went on to write for his successor in the Rhineland 
Palatinate.
91
 
 The number of those employed to produce imperial documents was also notably 
modest—strikingly so under the earliest post-Staufer kings. Harry Bresslau was able to 
identify just eight notaries, along with two chancellors and three protonotaries, from the 
whole of Rudolf I’s eighteen-year reign.92 Six clerks can be ascribed to William of Holland as 
king, though to these must be added further, shorter-term manpower.
93
 The size of the body 
of scribes serving the monarch is difficult to gauge, since even among those active at court 
over a long period, some wrote documents only occasionally or untypically, among other 
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tasks.
94
 Numbers of clerks might fluctuate sharply within a single reign.
95
 Yet even the 
highest figures look low beside the chancery of the fourteenth-century English kings 
(discussed by Peter Crooks, below), with its hierarchically-graded staff of over a hundred at 
any one time.
96
 The beneficiaries of imperial diplomas not uncommonly took a hand, 
alongside chancery staff, in their drafting. In some instances, although less often after the 
thirteenth century, they were clearly the creators of the finished and binding document, to 
which imperial servants can have done little beyond affix a seal.
97
 
 The distinctly meagre resources of late-medieval imperial administration appear 
peculiarly ill-matched to the task of governing a vast Empire which was both multi-ethnic 
and multi-lingual. Even under the Staufer, it appeared as, to say the least, paradoxical to 
many that Italy and southern Gaul, with their ancient literate cultures, were under the rule of 
monarchs drawn from regions where the cultivation of letters was generally less advanced.
98
 
In the application of writing to government, imperial centre had little indeed to teach imperial 
periphery. By the late Middle Ages, a perceived cultural chasm was troubling thoughtful 
Germans too. Writing in the mid-fourteenth century, Konrad von Megenberg regretted what 
he claimed was a German custom, of mocking literate knights as ‘book-eaters’, and trusting 
to physical strength alone.
99
 Around the same time, the importance (but implicitly also the 
difficulty) of fostering verbal and textual communications in the Empire’s highest affairs was 
acknowledged by that most literate of emperors, Charles IV. His Golden Bull stipulated 
(although to no effect) that the German-speaking sons of the temporal electors, from their 
seventh year, were to receive instruction in Italian and ‘Slavic’ (Czech), as well as Latin.100 
 Yet during this same late-medieval period, the Empire’s German-speaking core, from 
which its servants were overwhelmingly drawn, seems in the matter of governmental literacy 
to turn inward upon itself. The only vernacular language in regular use in the late-medieval 
imperial chancery was German. It had first appeared under the later Staufer, and its 
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application then gathered pace under the count-kings of the second half of the thirteenth 
century—middling noblemen, whose own documentary milieu was increasingly a vernacular 
one.
101
 By the time of Wenceslas a century later, a clear majority of chancery documents was 
in German.
102
 Yet few comparable linguistic accommodations were made for the Empire’s 
large non-German populations. There had been French-language documents bearing the 
imperial seal already under William of Holland, and there were more, although never many, 
under Charles IV.
103
 The reign of Wenceslas saw the isolated use of Czech.
104
 The imperial 
chancery is not, however, known to have drawn up documents in Occitan, or in an Italian 
dialect. The inhabitants of Lombardy, Tuscany and the kingdom of Arles had to make do 
with Latin for such communications as occasionally came their way. 
 In light of all this it would appear that what held the late-medieval Reich together was 
a relative absence of bureaucracy. The cohesion, it is true, was far from total. Territories were 
lost in Italy, in Arles, and, to a lesser extent, along the western margins of the northern 
regnum, with the French crown the greatest beneficiary.
105
 But given the limited means 
available to kings and emperors for their defence, it is the modesty of the Empire’s territorial 
contraction that is chiefly remarkable. The explanation must lie at least in part with the 
lightness of the hand of imperial government upon outlying provinces. Coercive intervention 
south of the Alps in the style of the Staufer, while it long remained a potent symbol and 
memory, had ceased by the middle of the fourteenth century to be a fact of political life.
106
 
Local and regional elites were left extensive scope to act largely unconstrained, albeit often 
under a mantle of imperial legitimacy that had been dearly purchased. An Empire from 
whose ‘centre’ so little was routinely to be expected or feared made among the provincial 
powers few intractable enemies. 
 
IV 
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However, to concentrate only upon the benefits which flowed from what the Empire did not 
or could not do is insufficient. There are a number of reasons why the importance of 
documents and their makers within the political culture of the late-medieval Reich needs to 
be taken seriously. Most straightforwardly, while the absolute numbers of writings produced 
under the monarch’s seal cannot stand comparison with late-medieval Europe’s more prolific 
bureaucracies, they do nevertheless increase very considerably, even in spite of the major 
disruptions to which imperial administration was periodically subject. The total of more than 
4,800 documents traceable from the ten-year reign of King Rupert represents a roughly six-
fold increase on the tally for Albert I, produced over a comparable period just a century 
before.
107
 The upward trajectory was to continue: from Maximilian I’s reign, at the end of the 
fifteenth century, more than 100,000 chancery writings are known.
108
 
 If the Reich witnessed no late-medieval administrative revolution, growth of a more 
gradual kind did occur. Although the chancery remained small in comparative terms, its staff 
increased significantly over the course of the period. Only three scribal hands have been 
linked to the brief anti-Staufer kingship of the Thuringian Henry Raspe—and one of those 
probably belonged to a notary borrowed from a cardinal’s entourage.109 But by 1444, whence 
comes the earliest precise record, fourteen beds were needed in Frankfurt to accommodate 
Frederick III’s chancery staff, even without his Hofgericht scribes.110 Established practices 
changed to facilitate growth. In the fourteenth century, it became the norm to appoint as 
chancellor a bishop, whose diocesan clergy thereby became available as literate servants to 
the monarch, as also did ecclesiastical livings to support officials.
111
 Accompanying the 
extension of manpower and the growth of documentary production, there gradually 
developed more scrupulous methods for recording the chancery’s output. Registration of 
outgoing writings became not only more regular but more elaborate. Under Wenceslas, Latin 
and vernacular diplomas began to be registered separately.
112
 The reign of his successor, 
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Rupert, saw the employment of separate chancery books for imperial and territorial affairs, as 
well as for documents addressing a range of specific matters.
113
 
A growing closeness in the court’s relations with urban society—symptomatic of the 
late-medieval ‘knitting-together’ (G. Verdichtung) of German society more generally—found 
reflection in the chancery as in other spheres.
114
 Under Charles IV and Wenceslas, an 
interrelated group of Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian patrician kindreds supplied 
successive chancellors over a sixty-year period. These men were clerics, but in 1433, with the 
appointment of Kaspar Schlick, a layman of burgher stock attained the office.
115
 Starting in 
the fourteenth century, the sons of rich urban families also gained growing responsibility for 
fiscal affairs at court.
116
 The capacity for institutional change and new growth, moreover, was 
not altogether stifled. By the start of the fifteenth century, the patent inadequacies of the 
Hofgericht, due particularly to the proliferation of exemptions, had stimulated a desire for 
new judicial solutions. Reflecting this, the personal justice of the monarch (from which none 
could be exempt) gradually attained more institutional form, as a ‘chamber court’ (G. 
Kammergericht), the rise of which had by mid-century completely eclipsed the older 
forum.
117
 
 But to look only for traces of the bureaucratic growth familiar from modernisation 
narratives of the rise of ‘the state’ elsewhere in Europe is perhaps in any case to mistake the 
significance of documents and their makers in the late-medieval Reich. For the importance of 
both, although considerable and growing, did not lie only in strictly administrative spheres. 
Writings in the monarch’s name carried an ideological charge which, potentially, pervaded 
every detail.
118
 Documents did not need to be abundant in order to matter; and the late Middle 
Ages were famously a time of notable documents. The history of the Empire, like that of the 
papacy which it often appears to shadow, can be—indeed, once used to be—written through a 
succession of resonantly-named public acts: the 1235 Peace of Mainz, Licet iuris, Fidem 
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catholicam, the Golden Bull, the Reformatio Friderici, and so on. Although texts of this sort, 
ideological in content and general in their significance, were few in number and quite 
untypical of the mass of imperial writings, the studies of earlier generations of constitutional 
historians have made them famous. And that fame has a degree of justification, since some of 
them at least attracted significant notice and comment at the time of their appearance. Even 
when the initial reception was muted, the general significance of such a document might 
attain recognition with the passage of time, as was the case with the Golden Bull, widely 
copied and disseminated (albeit almost solely within Germany) during the century-and-a-half 
after its issue.
119
 The Golden Bull illustrates how, in an age with a prodigious and growing 
appetite for reproducing texts of all kinds, an imperial document too, once its importance had 
been duly acknowledged, might be disseminated by widespread copying, independently of 
the chancery. 
 However, the Empire’s rulers themselves also grew increasingly alert to the power of 
documents, particularly their ideological potential, paying heightened attention to their 
production and communicative capacity. The commissioning by Wenceslas of a sumptuous 
illustrated manuscript of his father’s Golden Bull seems to have been a response to his 
deposition by the princes in 1400. By this means he was able graphically to place himself at 
the centre of those constitutional processes by which legitimate kings were made—and kings 
made legitimate.
120
 The paraphernalia of document-making, pictorial as well as scribal, 
became the subject of purposeful manipulation. Fourteenth-century emperors, most notably 
Ludwig the Bavarian, introduced new elements into their great seals, in order to magnify their 
titles to rule.
121
 Sigismund employed one of the finest goldsmiths of his day, a master perhaps 
linked with the French royal court, to cut the matrix for his imperial seal.
122
 The external 
appearance of the documents themselves, and particularly of solemn privileges, came in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to be treated as a matter of foremost importance.
123
 With 
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time, moreover, the means were attained of matching aspiration with achievement. If William 
of Holland’s clerks had struggled to create anything beyond the most workaday charters, the 
magnificent illustrated diplomas issued in the name of Ludwig the Bavarian, less than a 
century later, attest to the availability of scribal resources of a quite different order.
124
 
 Although most imperial documents were created for highly specific addressees, there 
was an important, if very small, minority in which the king or emperor and his advisors 
sought to excite a more general awareness. Ludwig the Bavarian had his mandate Fidem 
catholicam (1338) posted up on church doors, notably in the city of Frankfurt.
125
 There are 
signs, in the form of chronicle reports of its contents, that the emperor’s efforts thus to attain 
widespread notice for his case against the papacy achieved some success.
126
 The potential 
audience for public outbursts of monarchical self-justification may have been greater than 
first appearances suggest. As Ernst Schubert has pointed out, a lengthy imperial mandate, 
displayed in a public place, would have been impressive even to those unable to read its 
text.
127
 Report (if doubtless not always wholly accurate) of its contents would quickly have 
begun to circulate. There are signs that Ludwig’s court gave serious thought to the problem of 
communications, particularly with audiences in the north. The archbishop of Salzburg is to be 
found lamenting to the pope that when the emperor’s partisans publicly denounce the pontiff 
in Latin, translators are on hand to render their words instantly into German.
128
 
 If the documentary culture of the Reich remained in some ways comparatively 
limited, and was certainly relatively unobtrusive in the lives of most of those who stood under 
the Empire’s rule, it was not in all respects unsophisticated. That the chancery, particularly 
from Ludwig IV’s reign onward, was no marginal body is indicated by the quality of those 
who filled its most prominent roles. Its leading personnel came to represent for the monarch a 
reservoir of literate expertise whose value extended well beyond the strictly bureaucratic. By 
the early fifteenth century, doctors and licentiates of the two laws had come to dominate the 
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leading posts.
129
 Such men were far from being mere stay-at-home clerks, but were well-
connected and widely-travelled diplomats and counsellors, richly experienced in the Europe 
of their day. Increasingly, they were attaining to the characteristics of a careerist corps, 
moving easily between the higher reaches of ecclesiastical and secular government, and 
united particularly by bonds forged in a common early experience of university studies.
130
 
The foremost literate servants of the Reich did not obviously stand behind their counterparts 
in document-rich England in their cultivation and wide horizons.
131
 
 The more extended and informal networks of learned expertise which the imperial 
court was able to tap, at least on specific occasions, were no less significant. The Empire’s 
particular territorial form and extent, its historical and doctrinal foundations, and its unique 
relationship with the Catholic church and papacy had all tended to draw its rulers into 
fundamental conflicts of ideas and principles. These had formed a significant element in the 
history of the Reich since the eleventh century, with protracted controversy continuing well 
into the fourteenth and its resonances still discernible for long thereafter.
132
 At all times, these 
disputes had been fought out by textual, no less than political and military, means. As a 
consequence, writers and thinkers of the stature of William of Ockham and Marsilius of 
Padua gravitated to the late-medieval imperial court.
133
 The rulers of the Reich were able on 
occasion to profit from learned outside advice of rare distinction. It perhaps reflects his 
judgement on the limitations of the Empire’s literate culture that the duke of Austria, Rudolf 
IV, in the late 1350s felt able to confect the audacious bundle of forgeries known as the 
Privilegium maius, replete with purported charters of Caesar and Nero. However, if Rudolf 
had hoped thereby to establish ancient foundations for Austrian ambitions within the Reich, 
he had reckoned without the forensic skills of Petrarch, to whom Charles IV passed the 
documents, and who duly subjected them to his withering humanist scorn.
134
 Being a neo-
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Roman emperor could unlock sources of specialist literate expertise not available to every 
European prince of the day. 
 What the rulers of the Reich most conspicuously lacked, in the eyes of contemporaries 
and evidently their own, were, at least for substantial parts of the late-medieval period, the 
resources not of ‘modern’ administration so much as traditional legitimacy. However, 
administrative institutions and personnel seemed in some degree able to supply resources of 
this second kind, and were evidently valued for that reason.
135
 Where the Empire’s rulers 
often appeared particularly deficient was in the security of title which came from a sense of 
unproblematic continuity.
136
 Yet the literate servants of the monarch were better able to 
embody such continuity than may at first appear, and their capacity in this respect grew over 
the course of the period. 
Actual continuities of imperial service became increasingly conspicuous, reflecting in 
part the development of a more stable alternation of the crown, between just three rich 
princely dynasties—Wittelsbach, Luxemburg and Habsburg—during the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. An outstanding, though untypical, example is provided by Wenceslas’s 
succession to the throne of Charles IV. This was accompanied by the transfer of a significant 
portion of the aged emperor’s corps of literate servants to his son.137 More common, 
however, was for the higher-ranking officers to remain in place between reigns. These were 
the figures whom rulers would most have wished to retain, not only for their expertise, but for 
the legitimising continuity of distinguished service which they embodied. Their consolidation 
into an elite of interconnected, high-ranking graduate specialists made such men—in contrast 
to lesser clerks, with their local roots and territorial ties—more likely to prolong their service 
under an incoming monarch. By the fifteenth century, therefore, important administrators 
were staying on, or even shifting allegiance to serve a new king, in a way that had previously 
been rare. Johannes Kirchen, a leading Hofgericht notary under Wenceslas, went on to act as 
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protonotary to both Rupert and Sigismund.
138
 Kaspar Schlick served as chancellor under 
three monarchs—Sigismund, Albert II and Frederick III—and his contemporary, the 
chamberlain Konrad von Weinsberg, was able to show a similar record of high office under 
successive rulers.
139
 
 Sites of administrative memory, such as they were, were cherished, precisely on 
account of the ties which they offered to remote, legitimising pasts. Speyer ceased to be an 
imperial mausoleum after the early fourteenth century; yet the old Salian power-base retained 
a surprising degree of importance to the Empire’s administration, continuing into the fifteenth 
century to provide a disproportionate number of bishop-chancellors and other senior 
figures.
140
 This is unlikely to be coincidence. Document culture, and those who sustained it, 
had particular benefits to offer the insecure and sometimes weak rulers of the late-medieval 
Reich. In securing the service of a chancery scribe who had previously written for the Staufer 
Henry (VII), William of Holland tapped a tradition extending back to the emperor and 
Sicilian king Henry VI (r. 1190-97), under whom that scribe’s own mentor had trained.141 
Documents themselves, with their routine, traditional formulations, constructed unbroken 
pasts for times of confusion and rapid change.
142
 When William of Holland, in a diploma for 
the Frisians, refers in passing to Charlemagne as ‘our predecessor’, the effect is at once banal 
and audacious: a formulaic statement of the obvious and a resonant title for an otherwise 
dangerously under-entitled king.
143
 No pretender to the throne, however wild and marginal, 
could afford to forgo the visible and accustomed legitimacy which documents conferred. It 
was a strong argument in the hands of the imposter who briefly ‘reigned’ on the lower Rhine 
in the 1280s, in the guise of a returned or resurrected Frederick II, that he was able to produce 
letters in the dead emperor’s name, authenticated with a plausible imitation of his seal.144 
 
V 
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At least when judged by the actions and achievements of its rulers, the Reich was among the 
least imperialistic, as well as least bureaucratic, of the realms of late-medieval Europe. It did 
not order its far-flung provinces within centralising structures like the kingdom of France, or 
expand with the startling speed of Valois Burgundy. Instead it contracted somewhat, although 
outright disintegration never looked likely. Its rulers showed neither the venturesome spirit of 
the Iberian kings in seeking new lands, nor the English monarchy’s ready recourse to military 
solutions. Any talk of a late-medieval ‘imperialist dynamic’, such as others displayed, would 
be quite out of place.
145
 Nevertheless, the Empire’s government did not altogether stagnate. 
The two centuries after the fall of the Staufer brought modest and piecemeal steps towards 
greater administrative sophistication, although the effects of these were largely confined to 
the old-established core lands of the Reich, in central and southern Germany. Relations 
between government and society became more complex and more intimate—but again, 
mainly in regions where they had traditionally been close. The change primarily reflected 
developments in society, not government. A more thoroughgoing reform and extension of 
imperial institutions was to be instituted at the close of the fifteenth century.
146
 For this, the 
relatively limited nature of the imperial bureaucracy proved an advantage. Reform was not 
constrained by the existence of elaborate cadres of rule-bound, conservative mandarins 
(however constrained it may have been in other ways). The proliferation or perpetuation of 
bureaucracy is no more a necessary symptom of an empire’s health than limited institutions 
reliably indicate its impending collapse. The late-medieval Reich, with all its shortcomings, 
fared notably less badly in difficult times than did its depleted and crisis-stricken counterpart 
in Byzantium.
147
 When disaster finally came, in 1453, it was the proverbially bureaucratic 
eastern, not the western, Roman empire that was swept away.
148
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 While the explanations for the Empire’s long survival are many and complex, they 
must be sought partly in what it could not do—and in the late Middle Ages did not aspire to 
do. The cities of northern Italy, which under the Staufer had joined together in military 
alliance against the emperors, now mostly free of the molestation of German armies, directed 
their concerns elsewhere.
149
 Relations between imperial ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, insofar as 
these terms are illuminating, were in the late Middle Ages less fraught—because less close—
in the Reich than in other European empires. That the imperial court should have aspired to 
police the personal and cultural interactions of its German-speaking agents with the 
inhabitants of Lombardy or Arles in the manner of the English in Ireland was more than just 
unattainable: it was unthinkable.
150
 The Reich had no aspiration, and made no attempt, to re-
shape the customs of provincial society as other empires have historically sought to do.
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That, surely, is not the least among the reasons for its long endurance. 
 To a degree, the Empire’s literate servants did what bureaucrats do: contributed, 
through their existence and their actions, to the public myth of their masters’ power and 
effectiveness. But this was a less feasible venture in the Reich than in some other realms, and 
had less certain results. It would have been impossible—in contrast, for example, to medieval 
English imperialism—for the Empire’s rulers and their German clerks to have postured as the 
bearers of literate civilization to under-developed barbarians in the provinces.
152
 Instead, 
charges of unlettered barbarism, when they were heard, mostly flowed in an opposite 
direction. Yet the Empire’s scribes too were servants of a myth—and a more potent and 
venerable one than was available to most medieval imperialists. The trouble with texts is that, 
by their existence, they tempt us to reach unfavourable judgements upon those places where 
they appear to be relatively less present.
153
 But, as recent studies of the political culture of the 
late-medieval Reich have insisted, texts did not stand alone, but were joined to other 
communicative media within a ‘polyphonic concert for the staging of rulership’.154 
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Nevertheless, their role remained a fundamental one, since the medieval Roman imperium 
found its deepest legitimation in authoritative ancient texts, not least the Bible itself. Words 
had particular importance for the Empire’s rulers, and that importance grew rather than 
diminished in the late Middle Ages, for monarchs whose claims to the throne often appeared 
contestable and called for defence. Important too, therefore, were the clerks responsible for 
finding, framing and disseminating those words. 
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